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Abstract. An opposition between two conceptions of our knowledge of the external world is outlined. On the one hand physicists, like Dirac and Heisenberg, maintain that only what Physics considers real is actually real. On the other hand, psychologists, like Metzger, Kanizsa and Bozzi, believe that every sensible content is real, so that the Psychology of perception is the real Physics. We attempt to sketch a critical perspective, based on a reasonable criterion, in order to prospect a different solution to this question.






It is a well known fact, concerning the philosophical discussion about «realism», that two different theoretical stances towards the real epistemic power of sensible experience have been confronting each other for a long time within the tradition of western philosophy. As far as the modern age is concerned, it is possible to maintain that anti-realistic positions towards perception have been largely based on the extraordinary success obtained by the Copernican revolution. In fact, starting from the wide spread of Copernicus’ discoveries, the belief, already rooted within the Platonic tradition, that sensible experience is by no means a good starting point to understand real nature of external world, has increasingly taken over. “Is it not true after all”, it has often been repeated, “that perception holds it to be the sun which is actually revolving around us, and not the other way around?”. The first of the six renowned Meditations of Descartes, which certainly represents one of the fundamental modern texts on this subject, completely shares this view. “All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty”, Descartes writes, “I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived”​[1]​. Sensible experience therefore is not, according to Descartes, a solid ground on which to base our knowledge. Since my senses have deceived me just once, the philosopher argues with what we might call an excess of strictness, I’ll never be able to trust them again. Leibniz as well, who surely deserves credit for having elicited an important, and essentially anti-Cartesian, reassessment of the role played by sensations within human knowledge by admitting the existence of the so-called «small perceptions», i.e. perceptive functions which take place below the threshold of our consciousness, sets serious limits to the powers of sensible knowledge. This sort of knowledge, in fact, always remains, within his epistemology, in a subordinated position and needs to be amended by scientific research, which alone can guarantee to man the possibility to progress from confused perceptions to clear ideas.​[2]​. Similar positions towards sensible experience are also very easy to be found if, skipping over a few centuries, we move on to the more recent times. Analogous epistemological views were shared by some of the great fathers of quantum mechanics, e.g. Werner Heisenberg (1958) and Paul Dirac (1947), according to which our senses are responsible for producing endless illusions and the only reality we constantly deal with in our every day life consists of that odd and deeply puzzling world described by microphysics. Contrary to classical Physics, which was intended to see the universe as a connection of observable entities, in order to provide us with a mental model, within space and time, of the whole plan, Paul Dirac argues in the preface to his 1947 volume on The principles of Quantum Mechanics, that the fundamental laws of nature, according to modern Physics, no longer directly describe our surrounding world, but only a substratum of which we cannot form a mental model without introducing inaccuracies​[3]​. If we set aside their mathematical formulation, Dirac argues, the theories of the new natural science appear to be built up on physical concepts, which cannot be properly explained in words. Unfortunately for the philosopher though, the world described by quantum mechanics (the latter, according to physicists, is the best explanation of microphysical events we can rely on at the moment) implies, amongst other curious things, the existence of entities which one could find, at the same time, albeit in a complementary percentage, in different portions of space. This well known phenomenon of quantum mechanics has often been referred to in recent epistemology by the term superposition. The very experimental evidence of these entities, physicists maintain, makes it even more necessary to give up for good the claim of ascribing any kind of reality to the world described by sensible experience. Even if we perceive objects as spatially localized, they insist, scientific research on the atomic structure of matter tells as that reality itself is quite different. In other words, our senses are deceiving us once again and our confidence in them in no way represents a reliable epistemic criterion. It is probably the awkwardness aroused by this deep splitting of our world into two completely different levels of experience that suggested to the renowned astronomer, physicist and philosopher of science Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882-1944), while he was ardently trying to show the many influences that modern Physics had on western philosophical thought, the example of the two tables, the physical and the commonsensical one, in front of which it is ideally necessary to stand before approaching any epistemological or metaphysical questions​[4]​. The awareness, recently acquired by modern Physics, of representing a highly symbolic human activity, Eddington maintains, has to be placed amongst the greatest scientific achievements of man. Physics, Eddington says, aims at the construction of a world, which will be a symbol of the world of common sense, but the process itself through which the world described by physicists is turned into the one familiar to man, is not part of Physics. It is, we would like to add, part of Psychology. The scientist, Eddington writes, is content with letting the philosopher establish the correct relationship between the physical and the commonsensical world. Even though, because of similar stands, Eddington was, in the course of his long and brilliant career, often accused of idealism by his fellow-physicists, we must never the less make clear that the real table always remained for him the one described by Physics and we can therefore, in his opinion, only ascribe a very small amount of cognitive power to our every day experience of the external world. 
One last classic position within the literature concerning the connections between experience and reason, which exemplifies very well the general attitude we have here been trying to outline, is the well known article written by the American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”​[5]​. According to the famous philosopher, what he calls «manifest image» of «man-in-the-world», however important it may be, will never be able to be considered as a possible source of knowledge of reality. Even if the manifest image, from his point of view, is certainly capable of a gradual improvement of the empirical and categorial notions it uses to describe the world, it does not at all represent, to use his own words, “the measure of what there really is”​[6]​. Just as firm is his flat refusal of the idea, held by Eddington, that science is “a mere ‘symbolic tool’ for finding our way around in the manifest image”​[7]​. “The scientific account of the world”, Sellars resolutely claims, “is (in principle) the adequate image”​[8]​.


2. The misery of reason

The philosophical attitude we have so far outlined, which surely represents a sort of mainstream stance of modern epistemology, could not help, right from its first appearance, but meet several bold opponents along its way. In what follows, due to limits of space, we will just try to draw attention to the emergence, within the last century of European cultural History, of a specific psychological and philosophical tradition, intended to question some of the main theoretical foundations inherited from the past, especially the above recalled methodical devaluation of sensible experience. If, in fact, we look at the first part of the Nineteenth century, our attention can hardly avoid being captured by that wide scientific and cultural Central European movement generally, and often ambiguously, known as Gestalt Psychology. We believe that proper attention has not always been paid to the fact that the Gestaltist tradition can number amongst its main leading figures several scientists of remarkable philosophical importance, among which the renowned German psychologist Wolfgang Metzger (1899-1979). In his fundamental Psichologie​[9]​, first published in 1941, Metzger tries to characterize a specific epistemological position concerning perception, which is deeply rooted in the western philosophical tradition. In doing so he effectively speaks of an «Eleatic postulate», according to which logical thought is the only possible judge between being and not being. One can easily catch, within this formulation, the echoes of a harsh dispute going on between the tradition of Gestalt Psychology and that well known form idealism enthusiastically advocated by several exponents of neo-Kantianism. Immediate data proceeding from our senses, according to the same principle, should never be definitely taken as reality, everything should previously be logically founded and, as a consequence, only what can be explained, could, strictly speaking, be considered as real. The paradigmatic example of such an epistemological stance is probably Zeno’s argument concerning Achilles and the turtle, which may well be considered as the final outcome of the general Eleatic views on motion: since motion cannot be rationalized, this argument claims, it does not exist. The same sort of stance towards sensible experience, according to Metzger, alarmingly marks out the approach to ontological questions of many of the above mentioned theoretical physicists. Unlike these scientists, he seems to have no doubts at all about the fact that all contents of our immediate perceptions are real. He believes as well that, no matter what physicists might claim, scientific theories are nothing but useful idealizations and schematic abstractions heavily depending on the world of our senses. Therefore, in order to achieve a real knowledge of the external world, it would be desirable from his point of view to formulate a systematic embracement of the opposite epistemological stance. We should, in other words, overturn the «Eleatic postulate». A similar epistemological view is to be found in several works published by the Italian psychologist Paolo Bozzi (1930-2003), who became known during the fifties because of his astute studies on the Psychology of perception, which may be regarded as an example of a well-chosen and prolific interplay of Gestaltist and Phenomenological tradition. The fundamental idea that guides Bozzi’s research is that the study of perception does not, properly speaking, pertain to Psychology, since it must be regarded as a very important part of the sound founding of an experimental science of the external world. Therefore, dealing with perception, from his point of view, primarily means having to do with reality itself and not with a well sorted set of illusions. It is precisely in this sense that he declares himself absolutely convinced of the possibility to found what he calls an «experimental Phenomenology», which could well be considered, to use his own words, as an “empirical science of reality tout court”​[10]​. Towards the end of the interesting article quoted above Bozzi also mentions that his teacher, the well known Italian psychologist Gaetano Kanizsa (1913-1993), used to state, in a challenging tone, “we are the real physicists!”​[11]​. We believe that Kanizsa’s enthusiasm, even if his position is not completely acceptable, represents a provocation which should be seriously taken into consideration. The point of view of his pupil, being more critical, seems to us, therefore, more sharable, since it tends to introduce a sort of gradualness within his position and to soften the harsh approach of his teacher. “A good taxonomy”, Bozzi writes, “could probably discover that there exists a gradualness within these phenotypes of objects, which goes from the highly subjective to the unmistakably objective”​[12]​. It is true, Bozzi maintains, that in studying perception we are enquiring into the external world, but one must pay attention to the fact that often the external world itself shows different levels of objectiveness. As an example we could think of the difference between the table one dreamed of last night and the one that one has in front of oneself at this very moment, while awake. Thanks to the research of those who inquired into the external world before we did, as well as to our own exploring of it, it is not hard to become aware of the fact that in our everyday life we usually have at our disposal a sufficient number of reliable criteria, which enable us to arrange the different kinds of entities we happen to meet into different levels of objectiveness. That one is now living in a dream, therefore, is certainly possible, but it is also very unlikely, since good standards are available in order to distinguish between reality and fiction, and this fact would remain true, we might add, even if those standards, sometimes, did not work. This last circumstance explains, for example, those bizarre anecdotes reported by the French anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), who tells us about how many primitives were very inclined to ascribe reality to their dreams and to behave consequentially while waking​[13]​. Even Democritus, who was one of the first western philosophers to reveal the many deceptions hidden in the recesses of sensible experience, finds it nevertheless important to warn us against the risks of a complete depreciation of our senses. This is what emerges from the beautiful fragment in which the Greek philosopher stages and dramatizes the eternal dialogue between Reason and the Senses. “Opinion is colour”, Democritus writes, “opinion sweetness, opinion bitterness, Truth are the atoms and the vacuum […] Oh, miserable reason, you, who derive from us [the senses] all of your proofs, are trying to overthrow us? Your success would mean your ruin”​[14]​.


3. The work of the metaphysician

It is a plain fact, starting from Galileo Galilei, that modern science, within the course of its development, has always given a fundamental importance to the unavoidable authority of sensible experience. Indeed, if a direct access to the sensible contents of his consciousness was barred to man, it would not even make any sense to inquire, as Kant did, into the possibility of an empirical or a rational science in general. On the other hand, from our point of view, it is just as fundamental for a sound development of science not to lose sight of those efforts made in order to establish a more prolific dialogue between reason and the senses. As far as the epistemological discussion on realism is concerned, the need became generally felt, during the second part of the last century, to mediate between definitely Platonic positions, on the one hand, and radically phenomenalistic ones on the other, and to carefully weigh up the pros and cons of the two stances. When facing options that are often extreme and incompatible the need has become manifest, not only amongst philosophers, to adopt a more critical approach. This situation has brought the scientific world itself to be definitely more inclined than it used to be in the first part of the Nineteenth century to pay closer attention to the developments of that large field of philosophical research that we could generally refer to by the name of Metaphysics and to mark a sort of new beginning within western thought. We find indicative of this new interest in Metaphysics, for example, the fact that in a recent and fascinating expounding of the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics, Gian Carlo Ghirardi recalls the opinion of the renowned physicist and philosopher of science Abner Shimony, according to whom “the Twentieth century represents one of the golden ages of metaphysics”​[15]​. 
In a remarkable passage from the popular novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin, written in 1852 to support the abolitionist cause, the writer Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811-1896) depicts the rough escape of a black slave woman who, being hunted by her white owners and while holding in her arms a little baby, is pushed out of despair into wading across a river during its thaw by jumping from one ice-floe to another and risks being swallowed up by the billows. Borrowing the stimulating picture brought forth by Stowe’s lively imagination, we would like to compare the two epistemological stances described in the previous section to the two peaceful banks separated by the rushing billows of a big river. Following this metaphor we would like to assimilate the condition of the metaphysician to the precarious balance in which one finds himself in the effort of bridging the gap between the two banks without permanently standing on either one of the two sides of the river and nevertheless finding in this condition his proper strength.  
In order to carry out this purpose, we would like to start by suggesting that, by paying closer attention to our issue, it is not hard to realize that both positions introduced in the previous section are fatally undermined by a serious theoretical mistake that we could refer to as «the real mistake of Descartes». This mistake does not lie, in our opinion, in the often blamed psychophysical dualism (which by the way, in one form or in the other, could easily be ascribed to almost every human thinking), but rather in the claim to reach an absolute starting point of human intellectual efforts, a sort of mythical Archimedean stand point on which one could confidently base the whole of human knowledge. Such a methodological stance, as history has largely proved, cannot lead but to the most sterile scepticism or to the most dull dogmatism. The above mentioned metaphysician, on the other hand, is nowadays qualmlessly willing to admit that the way of human knowledge is an essentially probabilistic one, based, to use Popper’s words, on continuous conjectures and refutations, and he is therefore convinced of the advisability of exchanging the utopian search for certainty of Descartes’ First Meditation with the more cautious optimism of Otto Neurath, who suggested the metaphor of the sailors who have to refit their boat in the open sea, far from any safe arbour. The history of human knowledge has, in fact, taught us that every conclusion is liable to revision and that, for intrinsic reasons, nothing like a final science can ever exist. This would be even more true, if possible, for Metaphysics, whose nature is far more hypothetical than that of Natural Science. It therefore seems to us that both positions introduced above are made dogmatic by a sort of nostalgia for that mythical Cartesian ubi consistam, the reassuring warrants of which both philosophy and science of today could eventually give up.
Before proceeding any further, though, we would like to strike a blow for Descartes, in order to avoid the charge of having been too severe with the great French philosopher. It is our opinion that, as far as the above mentioned psychophysical dualism is concerned, a good amount of insight must be credited to Descartes for having been one of the first modern philosophers to observe that we can think of our thoughts as disembodied. In fact, despite the easy triumphalisms of the rising Neuropsychology, a serious neuropsychological science is not yet available. While we have, for instance, sound mechanics, which are able to connect successfully the motions of several physical bodies, and just as much sound Neurophysiology, which has made it possible to inquire into the different functions of the brain as well as into its relationships with the body, we cannot yet say the same of a neuropsychological science, which could clearly and effectively connect our mental states to the matter of our brain. All we have positively seen so far is just a series of statistical correlations between specific cerebral events and other particular mental states, which are supposed to correspond to them. However, these two kinds of entities are, unfortunately, so heterogeneous as to make their connection far from evident and to prevent us from speaking of a proper science, but rather of deeply fascinating empirics which still consists of gathering data and making very generic hypotheses about their meaning.


4. The problem of the metaphysician

As regards the two tables of Eddington mentioned above, the time has now come to ask: can the table of which Physics talks and the one of which Psychology talks be regarded as the same object? Granting, for the sake of argument, that the answer to this question should be positive, one could maintain that the two different descriptions given by the two sciences can, in many cases, be complementary to each other and increase the information available about an individual object. It is nevertheless easy to imagine situations, in which the two different descriptions given by Physics and by Psychology find themselves in evident contrast, giving rise to troublesome contradictions. There are in fact several kinds of entities which admit at least two different descriptions within very different theories, such as Physics and Psychology of perception, and these two descriptions talk about the same entity in two apparently incompatible ways. In the case of the above mentioned table, for instance, Physics assures us that, even if our sensible experience is making us think that we are dealing with a continuous object, we are actually in front of a discrete one, within which, moreover, empty space prevails over solid matter. Another example is given by the notion of space. While in our everyday life we are well aware of moving within a space that we consider anisotropic and which therefore shows the existence of an «up» and «down», the geometrical space used by physical theories to describe the world is notoriously isotropic. A third example, which may well serve our purpose, comes from the field of so called optical illusions. In the well known Müller-Lyer illusion, for instance, even if any measuring instrument, no matter how rudimental it might be, were to easily convince us of the fact that the two small bars are actually of the same length, we would nevertheless keep seeing them as different. Confronted by similar situations one is therefore unavoidably led to ask: how can we decide how an object actually is in those cases in which Physics and Psychology give us two different and openly contradicting descriptions of it? It is without any doubt possible, at this point, both to the physicist and to the psychologist, to object that this is not, properly speaking, a scientific question, since scientific questions can be formulated, and can therefore have a meaning, only within the bounds of a specific conceptual framework. This particular answer, though, does not really meet our expectations, since our question exceeds the sphere of competence of empirical science, and the hurried impatience of the physicist or of the psychologist therefore leaves the underlying metaphysical problem completely untouched. Unlike many authors mentioned in the first section, we firmly believe that our metaphysical question, involving properly normative aspects, though beyond natural sciences, could be answered by moving from the latter in a very critical fashion. 


5. The language of the metaphysician

In order to suggest, in the next section, our own solution to the problem expressed above, we find it helpful, as a first step, to add a few terminological remarks. We would like to begin by exchanging the terminological distinction introduced by Wilfrid Sellars between a scientific and a manifest image for another distinction, which we hold to be closer to our views, namely the one between a «given image» and an «inferred image» of reality. The latter distinction is still somewhat defective, since, strictly speaking, both of our images could be regarded as “inferred”, but it is surely closer to the general meaning of our proposal. One could further distinguish, in an excess of thoroughness, between a more inferred and a less inferred image of reality, by which we mean images that stand closer or farther from the contents of our senses, but this would probably be a useless terminological complication, which would not make our task any easier. In what follows we will therefore put our trust in the good will of the reader and stick to our first distinction. Even without wishing to assimilate in any way our metaphysical stance to the Platonic outcomes of the great English logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), which would certainly mislead the reader, it could nevertheless be useful, in order to make our position clearer, to recall the distinction introduced by this author in 1912 between what he called knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description​[16]​. The first kind of knowledge, according to Russell, refers directly to experience, i.e. it deals with that part of our sensible experience, of which we become aware without the intervention of any inferential process. It is precisely in this sense that, in what follows, we will make use of the expression «given image». Indeed, there are sciences, such as the Psychology of perception, to which we are generally inclined to ascribe a lower level of accuracy than to other sciences, for example Physics, which hold the inquiry into what we called the «given image» of reality to be their main task.
We will also borrow from the Italian philosopher of science Evandro Agazzi​[17]​ a further distinction which may also serve our purpose, namely the distinction between the «reality» and the «objectiveness» of our descriptions of the world. We can start by pointing out the fact that, at least in a minimal sense, it is possible to maintain that everything that shows itself as external can be regarded as real. Every intentional object, to put it in a phenomenological way, can be regarded as having its own reality and this obviously applies to the friend one is talking to at the moment as well as to the blue dragon one dreamed of last night. From a physical point of view though, as remarked by Agazzi, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between the reality of these objects, on the one hand, and their objectivity, on the other. Let’s see. While arranging our external data into «objects» we can usually count on a series of hints which enable as to decide, for example, that the friend we are talking to at the moment and who is making us angry, is definitely more objective than the blue dragon we dreamed of last night and who scared the hell out of us. This means that these realia establish amongst themselves some kind of objective relations which manifest themselves through permanence or immutability and that their objectiveness has therefore very much to do with the notion of invariance. In other words, the more we are able to detect, within each one of these entities, whole sets of invariance, and the more, we could also add, the number of symmetries within these sets increases, the more those entities will become objective to us. This invariance, moreover, needs not to be of an exclusively empirical nature, since there can also be an invariance of a categorial sort. Within the theory of special relativity for instance, as is well known, invariance is not to be found within space or time themselves, but within an established quantity of both dimensions “combined” together, the so called four-vector Δs. In the latter case we are therefore dealing with purely abstract notions.
One last useful distinction we would like to recall is a classical distinction within analytical philosophy, namely the one between a «referential» and an «attributive» use of the language. This distinction has recently been used by Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi in an astute article, in which they face the problem concerning the compatibility between our commonsensical world and the one described by Physics in a way that appears closer to the position of Sellars than to ours​[18]​. Also in this case an example will be useful to clarify the meaning of this distinction. Let us suppose that, while sitting at our desk, we met the eyes of a friend who is standing by the door on the opposite side of a big hall and that we addressed to him the following words: «Could you please call me the man who’s closing the door?». Now, since unfortunately we happen to be short-sighted, it is certainly possible that the person we are referring to wasn’t really a “man”, but a “woman” and that she wasn’t about to “close” the door, but to “open” it. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that our friend could still be able to understand what we are asking him to do. This is what we usually mean by speaking of a referential use of the language. On the other hand, we shall speak of an attributive use of it, in the case that the proposition we expressed was specifically intended to point out exactly some of the features of the person we are referring to. In order to avoid confusion, it is important furthermore to remark that this distinction between the two different uses of the language does not, properly speaking, concern propositions themselves, but the purpose according to which we express them, the task, we might also say, that they are supposed to carry out. A linguistic use could therefore be attributive even if the proposition we expressed failed to point out the exact features of the object we are referring to and vice versa. According to Casati an Varzi, the sensible and commonsensical description of the world has above all a referential use, whereas only the scientific description has an attributive use, so that only for the latter does it have any sense to speak about truth and falsehood. It will soon become clear that our position is different.


6. One possible solution

It is not hard to realize that at least some versions of so called «scientific realism», which is very popular amongst scientists, are nothing but idealistic positions, since they are very much inclined to dogmatically affirm the ontological reality of the unobservable theoretical entities introduced by the natural sciences. Within the form of «empirical realism» or «weak physicalism» we would now like to suggest, on the other hand, sensible experience plays a fundamental role, even if not as outstanding as it does within the phenomenological approach. Our aim, in fact, is to attempt to show a possible way of naturalizing the Kantian notion of an «object of possible experience», without securing it, as the great German philosopher did, to the pure intuitions of space and time and to the categories. The criterion according to which we will try to decide what can be regarded as an object of possible experience will therefore remain in the realm of current natural science.
We can now go back to the question that first gave rise to the terminological digression of the previous section and try to reformulate it in the light of the new distinctions introduced. We hope that reformulating the question will pave the way to our suggestion. We must remind readers that our question ran as follows: how can we decide what an object actually looks like in those cases in which Physics and Psychology give us two different and openly contradicting descriptions of it? After what we have just written, we can now add: since we have decided to assume that the description given by Physics and the one given by Psychology both refer to the same object, then we will also have to believe that both of them hold to be making a referential use of the language. If this is true, then how can we come to decide how the external world actually is? In other words, it seems to us that asking how the world really is ultimately comes down to asking what is the criterion, if it exists, that enables us to choose between its physical and its psychological description when these two descriptions appear to be incompatible. Thus, which of the two could have an attributive role as well? We are now finally able to state our own position on this subject: When confronted by two contrasting descriptions, a physical and a psychological one, of the same object, it is reasonable to trust the former only if there is a good scientific explanation of why our perception is deceiving us. This implies the fact that an effective «empirical realism» should be based on the following principle: we can accept as real only those unobservable features, about which a good scientific explanation of  why we cannot perceive them is available. In other words, when confronted by sensorial illusions or by the introduction of new theoretical entities, the burden of proof, from our point of view, falls on the person, or the science, that holds the given image to be deceptive.
Let’s start, for the sake of simplicity, with an example which pertains to the field of our senses only. When we are dealing with the case of the oar that, once plunged into the water, ceases to look straight, the clash doesn’t take place between an empirical datum and a theoretical description, but between two different sensorial fields, namely between sight and touch, which apparently cannot reach an agreement. In this situation, according to our proposal, in order to decide which of the two sensorial fields was to be trusted, one could conjecture the unreliability of one of the two senses and then check if a good scientific explanation of this unreliability happens to be  available. By doing this, one could soon come to the conclusion that, as far as sight is concerned, we actually have such an explanation, while nothing similar is available for the sense of touch. Why not suppose at this point that an analogous method could also be successfully applied into Metaphysics?
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